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Abstract 
The Uganda legal regime relies on the discretion of the courts in dealing with improperly 
obtained evidence. While various theories explain the need to exclude evidence, 
understanding their rationales sheds light on evaluating why the courts deal with this kind 
of evidence in the way they do. This article offers an assessment  of  selected  decisions  
handed  down  by  Uganda’s Supreme Court between 1995 and 2015 with regard to 
evidence improperly obtained through confessions. It seeks to establish the underlying 
theoretical considerations of the decisions, how the courts address aspects of procedural and  
substantive  justice,  and  whether  there  is  a  consistent  developed jurisprudence.  This 
analysis, therefore, supports the need for reform. 
 
I.  Introduction 
The investigative function of law enforcement officers is as important to the criminal 
process as the criminal trial because their improprieties in obtaining evidence may taint the 
functioning of the courts.1 
 
The investigative function may be abused and, as a consequence, lead to improperly 
obtained evidence.  This kind of evidence may be as a result of human rights violations or 
procedural impropriety. 
 
For purposes of this article, improperly obtained evidence refers to the latter, with no taint 
of human rights violations.2 This improperly obtained evidence may exist as a result of 
deceit, improper or unfair means without any additional  illegality.3 Instances include a 
non-designated officer obtaining a confession4 or obtaining evidence in the course of an 
inadmissible confession.5 
 
Other scenarios which are beyond the scope of this article include evidence obtained 
																																								 																				
1 C. Fai, Illegally obtained evidence, 15 SINGAPORE LAW REVIEW (1994), at 98. 
2 D.T. ZEFFERT AND A.P. PAIZES, THE SOUTH AFRICA LAW OF EVIDENCE 2 (2009) 711; see also, Fai id., at 99. 
3 A. Skeen, Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1 SAJCJ (1988), at 389. 
4 Nashaba v. Uganda (Criminal Appeal No.39 of 2000) [2002] UGSC 17 (15 April 2002). 
5 A. Choo, Evidence Obtained in Consequence of an Inadmissible Confession, 57 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW (1993), at 195-
198. 
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through illegal searches and seizures,6 entrapments,7 and the use of undercover police 
investigations to obtain confessions.8 This article limits its scope to confessions obtained 
through  improper  means.  First, it  seeks  to  establish  the  theoretical considerations that 
may be used to understand the rationales of the decisions; secondly, it  examines how the 
Supreme  Court  has applied  the concepts  of procedural  and substantive justice; and 
thirdly, it assesses whether there is a consistent jurisprudence dealing with improperly 
obtained evidence. 
 
II.  Concept of improperly obtained  evidence 
Different jurisdictions attach different meanings to the term ‘improperly obtained 
evidence.’ This may be due to the existence of statutory law or judicial interpretation.9 Some 
jurisdictions use  the  terms  ‘illegally’  and  ‘improperly  obtained  evidence’ interchangeably 
subject to proof of violation of the rights of an accused.10 
 
Other jurisdictions require that where procedural rules are not followed, a court may decline 
to admit the evidence.11 In South Africa, for example, the constitutional directive refers to 
improperly or illegally obtained evidence and requires that it should be subjected to the 
constitutional test before it is excluded.12 
 
The relevant section thus provides as follows: 
 
Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the bill of rights must be excluded 
if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental 
to the administration of justice.13 
 
This section requires that before the evidence is excluded there should be a violation of a 
constitutional right.14 In interpreting the above section, the South African courts have 
referred to this evidence as ‘improperly obtained evidence.’15 Notwithstanding the above, 
the South African courts still have the discretion under the common law to exclude 
improperly obtained evidence.  The exclusion can be done in instances where there has been 
no violation of human rights in the course of obtaining the evidence.16 
 
																																								 																				
6 Fai, supra note 1, at 98. 
7 S. Darren and W. Nicci, The Exclusion of Evidence obtained by Entrapment: Un Update, THE ORBITER (2011), at 634. 
8 B. Murphy and J.L. Anderson, Confessions to Mr. Big A new rule of evidence?, 20 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE 
AND PROOF (2016), at 29-48. 
9 See, section 35(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (South African Constitution) and section 359a of the Dutch 
Code of criminal procedure (Nederlandse Wetboek van Strafvordering (Sv) to be discussed below. 
10 See the subsequent discussion on South Africa. 
11 See the subsequent discussion on the Netherlands. 
12 For instance, section 35(5) of the South African Constitution; and S v. Mthembu [2008] ZASCA 51 where Cachalia J referred to the 
requirement to exclude improperly obtained evidence in terms of section 35(5). See also, Cameron J in S v. Tandwa [2007] SCA 34 
(RSA) para. 116. See further section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
13 Section 35(5) of the South African Constitution 1996. 
14 For a discussion of section 35(5) of the South African Constitution, see Zeffert & Paizes, supra note 2, at 721-775. 
15 Zeffert & Paizes id., at 721- 775. 
16 For a discussion on the exclusionary rule in South Africa, see Van der Merwe Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Towards 
Compromise between the Common Law and the Exclusionary Rule, 3 STELLEN L.R (1992), at 173-206. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za 
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In The Netherlands, The Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure, which regulates the assessment 
of illegally gathered evidence, provides: 
 
1.  If procedural  rules  prove  to  have  been  breached  during  the preliminary 
investigation, which breach can no longer be remedied, and  the  legal  consequences  of  
the  breach  are  not  apparent  from statutory law, the court may rule that: 
 
a). the severity of the punishment will be decreased in proportion to the gravity of the breach 
if the harm caused by the breach can be compensated in this way; b).  the  results  of the  
investigation  obtained  through  the breach  may not contribute to the evidence of the 
offence charged; c). the Public Prosecution Service will be barred from prosecuting if the 
breach makes it impossible to hear the case in compliance with the principles of due 
process.17 
 
This section allows a judicial officer discretion in how to deal with improperly obtained 
evidence. This evidence must have been obtained as a result of not following the 
procedural rules.  The discretion is wide and is not limited to non-admission of 
improperly obtained evidence.  The judicial officer may reduce the punishment due to the 
accused, or decline to admit the evidence, or bar the prosecution from prosecuting the 
accused.  The section does not limit itself to only improperly obtained evidence.  It may 
include violations of a procedure, which include human rights violations.18 
 
III. Theoretical considerations in regard  to admission  of evidence 
Various theories explain the rationale underlying the admission of evidence. The theories 
may lead to the inclusion or exclusion of evidence. A comparison of the tenets of these 
theories informs the decisions of the Supreme Court that are under review. These theories 
have been used by the Supreme Court and are classified into two groups: the forward-looking 
theories and the backward-looking theories.19  The forward-looking theories aim at ensuring 
that the persons who engage in obtaining evidence improperly are discouraged from doing so. 
At the forefront of these theories is the deterrent theory for exclusion of evidence.  This 
theory requires that illegally or improperly obtained evidence must be excluded from 
admission to deter the perpetrators from committing future acts of obtaining evidence 
improperly.20 
 
The condonation theory, on the other hand, is based on the assumption that courts will 
exclude improperly obtained evidence so that they do not condone improper or illegal police 
or investigative behaviour.21  The backward-looking theories attempt to correct the harm 
																																								 																				
17 Section 359a of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (Nederlandse Wetboek van Strafvordering (Sv). See, M.J. Borgers and L. 
Stevens, The Netherlands: Statutory Balancing and a Choice of Remedies, in EXCLUSIONARY RULES IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
(S.C. Thaman, ed., 2015), at 185. 
18 Borgers & Stevens id., at 185. 
19 M. Madden, A Model Rule for Excluding Evidence, 33 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015), at 447. 
20 Id., at 448. 
21 R.M. Eugene, Debunking Five Great Myths About the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 211 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 
(2012), at 239. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za 
4	
	
occasioned to the victims of the illegal or improper conduct.22 
 
The first theory is the compensatory theory which uses exclusion in order to recognise that 
rights have value, and that if the right is infringed the wrongdoer should provide  alternative 
value to the  rights  holder.23 
 
This theory is, however, criticized because an accused who would have been convicted may 
avoid a penalty if his rights were infringed before he was brought to trial.  This is because 
his rights, just like a victim’s rights, have value attached to them. The other backward-
looking theory is the vindication theory which affirms constitutional values through 
granting meaningful remedies.24 It would appear that the vindication theory promotes the 
observance of a given right rather than ensuring that the perpetrators are brought to justice. 
 
Another theory that may be used is the reliability theory. This theory provides that 
improperly obtained evidence may be as reliable as lawfully obtained evidence and may have a 
bearing on the innocence or guilt of an accused.25   The South African courts also use the 
protective theory which provides that an accused should not suffer a disadvantage  
because  of  evidence  obtained  through  human  rights  violations  by investigators.26  
These theories create a balance in the admission of improperly obtained evidence and the 
courts’ reasoning always leans to at least one of the theories.27 
 
A. Exclusionary Rule in Uganda 
There is no direct rule of exclusion of improperly obtained evidence in Uganda.  Like other 
former colonies of England, Uganda derives applicable common law and criminal law 
principles from England.28  This rule informs the way court decides on confessions, and it is  
on this basis that the principles that govern it are discussed. The general principle in 
common law jurisdictions is that relevant evidence is admissible unless it falls within a 
category which is excluded by law, or it is excluded in the exercise of ajudicial discretion.29 
 
The Evidence Act30 provides guidance in dealing with relevance and admissibility of 
evidence. The Act provides: 
 
Subject to any other  law,  evidence  may be  given  in  any suit  or proceeding of the 
existence or non-existence of every fact in issue, and of such other facts as are hereafter 
declared to be relevant, and of no others.31 
																																								 																				
22 Madden, supra note 19, at 453. 
23 D.M. Pacciocco, Section 24(2): Lottery or Law—The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning, 58 CRIMINAL LAW 
QUARTERLY (2011), at 21. 
24 Madden, supra note 19, at 454. 
25 Zeffert & Paizes, supra note 2, at 712. 
26 Id. 
27 These theories will be used in the analysis of case law by the Supreme Court shortly.  
28 Section 1 of the Penal Code Act Cap 120 Laws of Uganda. 
29 W. Van-Caenegem, New trends in illegal evidence in criminal procedure: general report (Report of the World Congress of the 
International Association of Procedural Law, held in Salvador,  Brazil, 2007), at 1  
30 Cap 6 Laws of Uganda. 
31 Section 4 of the Evidence Act; see part II generally of the Evidence Act. 
http://repository.uwc.ac.za 
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This section requires that for evidence to be admitted it has to be relevant to a fact in issue 
or it should relate to a fact in issue.  The relevance of evidence depends on its ability to 
address a substantive issue of the case or a question in dispute.32 The failure of any piece of 
evidence to do the former is a yardstick for its non-admission. With regard to the 
admissibility of relevant evidence, a court has to deal with two questions. First, it deals with 
the question of relevance to a substantive fact in issue.  The second question relates to 
relevance to the credibility of the evidence.33 In Uganda v. David Kamugisha,34   the 
accused sought to admit a letter into evidence that was purportedly signed by a prosecution 
witness and written to the accused.   The admission of this evidence was supposed to rebut 
the evidence of the witness who had testified that: first, she could not write anything other 
than her name; secondly, she was not a girlfriend of the accused; and thirdly, she held a 
grudge against the accused. 
 
The Court held that the admissibility of a piece of evidence depended on whether it was 
relevant to an issue before a court, otherwise the court record would be filled with evidence 
which was not sufficiently relevant and which had the effect of prolonging the trial because 
of immaterial matters. The letter turned out to be irrelevant to the substantive issues before 
the Court.  The evidence sought to be admitted failed to pass the initial relevance test.  If it 
had passed the test, then the relevance to the credibility of the evidence would have been 
put into consideration. 
 
Furthermore, with regard to the requirement that the evidence must relate to a fact in issue, 
failure to prove this relationship is detrimental to any attempts to admit that piece of 
evidence.  In Struggle (U) Ltd v. Pan African Insurance Company Ltd,35 at the 
commencement of trial, counsel for the plaintiff laid evidence to show that the defendant’s 
company did not exist.  The defendant objected to this evidence on the ground that the 
pertinent issue before the Court was whether the defendant’s company owned the premises  
and that therefore evidence to prove the non-existence of the defendant’s company was 
irrelevant.   The Court held that the issue of whether the defendant’s company had ceased 
to exist was not a fact in issue as it was not pleaded and that therefore evidence to prove its 
non-existence was not admissible.  The lack of a connection or failure by the plaintiff to show 
a connection between the evidence that the plaintiff sought to be admitted and the facts in 
issue was the reason why the evidence was not admitted. 
 
If evidence is admissible, the manner of its procurement does not matter.  It is on the basis 
of this rule that the exclusionary rule may be used.  In Kuruma s/o Kairu v. R,36  the 
appellant was convicted on a charge of being in unlawful possession of ammunition 
																																								 																				
32 J. Wanga, Evidence Obtained from Remote- Electronic Traffic Devices: An Argument for Admissibility in Civil and Criminal 
Contexts, 46 THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION (2010), at 102- 109. 
33 A. TERENCE, D. SCHUM AND W. TWINING, ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE 2 (2006) 96. 
34 (1988 – 90) HCB 77. 
35 (1990-91) KARL 46. 
36 Kuruma s/o Kairu v. R (1955) AC 197, 203; A. Choo & S. Nash, Improperly Obtained Evidence in the Commonwealth; lessons for 
England and Wales?, 11 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF (2007), at 78. 
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contrary to the Emergency Regulations.37 The ammunition was found as a result of a search 
carried out by two police officers who were below the designated rank of assistant inspector 
of police.  Although the officers had no power to search the appellant,38  the evidence 
recovered was nevertheless admitted.39 The ground of leave to appeal was that the evidence 
proving that the appellant was in possession of the ammunition had been illegally obtained 
and should not have been admitted.40 
 
The Court held that the test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is 
whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and a court is not 
concerned with how the evidence was obtained.41 The only exception to the rule was that a 
court has the discretion not to admit improperly obtained evidence if the strict rules of 
admissibility will operate unfairly against the accused.42 The rationale for this holding was 
that all relevant evidence was admissible, regardless of the manner in which it was 
obtained.43 The Court stated that when it was a question of the admission of evidence, it was 
not about whether the mode of obtaining the evidence was tortuous but excusable; it was 
about whether the evidence obtained was relevant to the issue being tried.44 Therefore, all 
evidence is admissible until an accused seeks to rebut this presumption. 
 
B. Substantive and Procedural  Justice 
Substantive justice refers to justice that emerges out of a given process45 which involves a 
value judgment about the content of law and its consequences.46 For instance, where a 
criminal statute provides for imprisonment for life for the offence of defilement, 
substantive justice is used to find value through other circumstances, externalities such as 
morality, religion or culture,47 and it evaluates the need to impose punishment which is 
proportionate to the crime to ensure that there is retribution or rehabilitation. 
 
On the other hand, procedural justice finds value internally in the regular and consistent 
application of  law.  The  judicial  officer  weighs  the  evidence,  the circumstances relating 
to the commission of the offence, before deciding on liability for the commission of the offence 
and the sentence. In the same way, where factual issues arise  about voluntariness in the 
recording of a confession, he has to weigh up the probative value of the evidence in the 
light of other corroborative evidence before making a decision on the admission of the 
confession.48 Furthermore, a system of criminal law  may  dictate  that  punishment  is  
																																								 																				
37 Kuruma v R, id., at 198. 
38 Regulation 29 of the Emergency Regulations. 
39 Kuruma v R, supra note 36, at 198. 
40 Id. 
41 Id., at 203. 
42 Id., at 204. The Court referred to Noor Mohamed v. The King [1919] AC 182 191-192 and Harris v. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions [1952] AC 694 707. 
43 Kuruma v. R, supra note 36, at 204. 
44 Id. The court referred to Regina v. Leatham (1861) 8 Cox CC 498 501 where Crompton J said: ‘It matters not how you get it; if you 
steal it even, it would be "admissible". 
45 W. SADURSKI, GIVING DESERT ITS DUE: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL THEORY (1985), at 49. 
46 N. Faso, Civil disobedience in the Supreme Court: Retroactivity between compromise and formal Justice, 75 ALBANY LAW 
REVIEW (2012), at 1614 
47 Id. 
48 See the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court below. 
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proportionate  to  the  crime,  or  that punishment serves ends, such as retribution or 
rehabilitation.  These are substantive goals and substantive justice would be achieved if 
these ends were met.  Accordingly, substantive justice is achieved after an objective 
assessment and not a subjective assessment. 
 
While substantive justice is referred to as the justice of the outcome, procedural justice is 
referred to as the justice of the process that brings about the outcome.49 Procedural  
justice  requires  that  all  cases  should  be  treated  in  the  same  way  in accordance with 
the law, regardless of the circumstances of a particular case, without regard to the defects or 
virtues of the case.50 In procedural law, therefore, justice is seen to be found in the form of 
the law and not in its content, and is delivered through adherence to its form.51 This is an 
indication that procedural justice may form part of substantive justice.  Therefore, where a 
given law provides for the procedure to follow in recording confessions,52  the procedure is 
supposed to be followed if the evidence is to be admitted.  It follows that if a police 
procedure is required to obtain particular evidence, it has to be shown to the satisfaction of 
the court that it has been followed before it is admitted.53 
 
By its nature, procedural justice imposes restraints on processes through which an outcome of 
substantive justice is obtained.54 It is, therefore, expected that as courts adjudicate cases, 
they should ensure that the processes leading to the obtaining of evidence and filing of 
cases are followed to the letter. Substantive and procedural justice are interrelated in a 
way that the latter is required for the existence of the former.55  The major question that 
arises out of this relationship is whether it can be said that where substantive and procedural 
rules are followed, one can attain the former. 
 
Consider a hypothetical case where all the rules are followed in obtaining a confession but 
the interpreter misinterprets the story of the accused in the process of recording it, which 
becomes evident when it is read back to the accused before he appends his signature.  A 
similar hypothetical case may arise where in the course of recording a confession, the 
procedure is not followed but the accused is identified as the person responsible for the acts 
that constitute part of the offence. 
 
In the first hypothetical example, justice may not be seen to be served if the accused is 
convicted: but, justice may still not be seen to be done in the second scenario, if the 
accused is convicted on the basis of a flawed process.   The two hypothetical situations 
raise the question of whether a system of procedural justice on its own produces substantive 
																																								 																				
49 Sadurski, supra note 45. 
50 D. Lyons, On Formal Justice, 58 CORNELL LAW REVIEW (1973), at 833. 
51 Id. 
52 Festo Androa Asenua v. Uganda, Unreported Supreme Court case 1 of 1998 2 October 
1998, at 26-30. 
53 See, Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v. Uganda Unreported case 33 of 2001 20 February 2003 and 
Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul and Kamanzi Joseph v Uganda unreported case 39 of 2003 1 November 2005. 
54 Sadurski, supra note 45. 
55 Id. 
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justice outcomes.56 There is a possibility, therefore, that the presence of procedural justice 
does not lead to substantive justice.57 
 
It follows that an inquiry into the basis of the decisions by the Supreme Court will help to 
show whether it has enforced substantive justice, procedural justice, or a fusion of substantive 
and procedural justice. 
 
C.  Confessions 
1. Legislative provisions—The recording of confessions in Uganda is regulated by the 
Evidence Act58 and the Guidelines to Magistrates on Recording Confessions.59  
 
The Evidence Act provides: 
 
(1) No confession made by any person while he or she is in the custody of a police 
officer shall be proved against any such person unless it is made in the immediate presence 
of— 
(a) a police officer of or above the rank of assistant inspector; or 
(b) a magistrate…60 
 
The wording of the section does not require that it is only a police officer above the rank of 
assistant inspector of police who can record a confession.  The requirement is that the 
confession should be made in the presence of a police officer who is at least assistant  
inspector of police. This is an indication that a police officer below the indicated rank may 
record a confession by an accused person if he is in the immediate presence of an officer at 
the level of inspector of police or of a higher rank. 
 
A  circular  from  the  Chief  Justice  replicates  the  wording.61 It  offers  an explanation to the 
effect that the section is designed to ensure that any statement made by a person in police 
custody is voluntary.  The rationale that can be deduced from the section and the circular is 
that they both require a space where an accused voluntarily offers his statement. In addition, 
the circular requires that the magistrate or officer may use an  interpreter if the accused 
chooses to use a language with which he is not conversant.62 It is therefore prudent that 
the magistrate or a designated police officer record the statement, instead of having the 
statement recorded by another person, in his immediate presence.  ‘Immediate presence’ 
should be interpreted literally to mean the physical presence of the magistrate or designated 
police officer in the room at the time of the recording of the confession.63  
																																								 																				
56 P. SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH : SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY (1994), at 437. 
See also, Faso, supra note 46. 
57 Faso id. 
58 Cap 6 Laws of Uganda. 
59 Instruction Reference C.J./c.b by the Chief Justice on Magistrates on Recording of extrajudicial statements dated 2 March 1973. The 
instruction offers direction to police officers as well. This nd circular was released after section 23 had been repealed by Decree 25 of 
1974. The Evidence (Amendment) Act of 1985 did not save the operation of section 23 of the Evidence Act Cap 101(as it was then). 
60 See s. 23 (1) b of Cap 6 Laws of Uganda. 
61 Note 59 par 1. 
62 Note 59 Guideline 9. 
63 See, Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v. Uganda Unreported case 33 of 2001 20 February 2003 
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The Evidence Act requires corroboration before an accused is convicted on the basis of a 
confession.  Section 28 provides: 
 
if  court  forms  the  opinion  that  the  confession  was  involuntarily obtained.  The 
protected from impropriety if at the time of making the confession, it appears to the court 
that having regard to the state of mind of the accused person and to all the circumstances, it 
was caused by violence,  force, threat, inducement or promise calculated in the opinion of 
the court to cause an untrue confession to be made. 
 
From the above section, the opinion of the Court that the confession was involuntarily 
obtained raises a presumption that the confession is inadmissible. The Court has to be 
satisfied  that  the  confession  was  obtained  voluntarily.64 This may  be  done  by 
establishing the absence [or presence] of violence, force, threats, inducement or promise in the 
course of recording the confession.65   It must be noted, however, that if the Court is satisfied 
that the impression that the confession was caused by any such violence, force, threat, 
inducement or promise is removed, it may proceed to have the confession admitted.66 
 
2. Analysis of case law—In Namulobi Hasadi v. Uganda,67 the appellant sought to have the 
confession rejected because it was improperly obtained. The improprieties included the fact 
that he did not sign the confession,68 that there was the insertion of a name of a detective on 
the confession,69 and that the confession was recorded in a room full of other police officers 
and people doing other work.70 The Court upheld the admission of the confession in 
evidence on the ground that it did not occasion any injustice to the appellant.71 With regard 
to the irregular recording of the confession, the Court  stated first, although the recording of 
the confession took place in a room occupied  by  other  people,  they  were  busy  with  
their  own  duties.72 The Court recognised the fact that the police do not usually have 
enough room for a recording officer to be alone with an accused,73 and that the appellant 
never complained about the irregularity in the mode of recording the confession.74 In 
addition,  although  the confession was recorded in a language the appellant did not 
understand, the fact that it was read back to him was proof that he voluntarily made it.75 
 
The appellant also informed the Court that the recording of the confession was not done in 
accordance  with the Evidence (Statements to police officers) Rules76 (hereinafter referred 
																																								 																				
64 Id. 
65 See, Zeffert & Paizes, supra note 2, at 519, on the meaning of a threat or promise of advantage made to a recording officer. 
66 See, s. 25 of Cap 6 Laws of Uganda. 
67 Namulobi Hasadi v. Uganda Unreported case 16 of 1997 13 July 1998. 
68 Id., at 3. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id., at 4 – 11. 
72 Id., at 4 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Evidence (Statements to police officers) Rules SI 6-1, Laws of Uganda 
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to as the Rules) regarding the procedure of recording confessions.77 The  Court  also noted  
that rule  7(a)  of the Rules  was repealed  by the Evidence (Amendment) Decree 25 of 
1971.  Instead of relying on the improprieties, the Court laboured to justify the admission of 
the confession on the basis of the fact that the rights of the accused had not been violated. 
Therefore, to a great extent, the confession was admitted because the appellant’s rights were 
not violated and not notwithstanding the irregularities.78 
 
The Court set a precedent which upheld the notion of substantive justice over that of 
procedural justice. This is so because it used a proportionality test to determine the use of a 
confession that was recorded with a lot of glaring irregularities which could be explained as 
not being fatal to the final outcome.  With the confession on the one side of the scale, the 
other side contained the facts that the appellant had been asked about the content of the 
confession and did not object thereto and also did not complain about the recording 
procedure.  In addition, the appellant at the time of his arrest had cooperated  with the  
police  in recovering evidence that pointed to his role in the commission of the murder.   
He had in his possession items belonging to the victim. Furthermore, the procedural law 
upon which the appellant relied to justify his claims had been repealed. These facts 
outweighed any rationale that the Court would have had to prefer procedural  justice over  
substantive  justice,  or to use procedural  law in obtaining the confession, to arrive at 
substantive justice. 
 
The court viewed the facts surrounding the recording of the confession in the light of other 
circumstances, such as the existence of other evidence, and the appellant’s role in the 
investigation process, and held that the admission of the confession would not cause an  
injustice to the accused.   While the Court handled a delicate matter properly,  it ought  to  
have denied  the admission  on grounds  of failure  to follow procedural laws by the police. 
 
The Court condoned the excesses of the police because there was no law to stop them, and the 
appellant had co-operated with the police in the investigation.  Although the accused was 
represented, his ignorance of the guidelines should not have been used as a ground to hold 
that there was no injustice occasioned to him. The Court was more interested in ensuring  
that  any failure to meet procedural safeguards in recording confessions could be justified  
if no injustice was occasioned to the accused.   This precedent that encouraged the 
admission of improperly obtained evidence when it did not occasion an injustice to the 
accused was wrong.  It caused procedural injustice to the appellant.   Four months later, 
the  Supreme Court, in Festo Androa Asenua v. Uganda,79  reproduced the rules passed for 
the recording of confessions.  They require, firstly, that an accused be cautioned before a  
statement is made.   Secondly, if the recording of the statement is made by a police officer, 
then he should be at the level of an Assistant Inspector of Police or higher.  Thirdly, the 
confession should be recorded by the officer in a language that the accused understands, in a 
																																								 																				
77 Id., Rule 4. 
78 Id. 
79 Festo Androa Asenua and Kakooza Dennis v. Uganda Unreported Supreme Court case 1 of 1998 2 October 1998, at 26-30. 
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room which should have only two people unless an interpreter is required.80 These rules set 
a standard which the Court hoped would reduce the improper recording of confessions by 
the police. 
 
In Nashaba Paddy v. Uganda,81 the appellant and three others were involved in  the  
commission  of  a  robbery.     When  the  appellant  was  arrested,  he  gave incriminating 
information to an inspector of police about himself and two other persons in the commission 
of the crime.82 After police had recovered the evidence on the basis of the information given, 
the appellant was taken to a Magistrate where he recorded an extra-judicial statement.83 On  
appeal, the appellant claimed that the confession should not have been admitted because of 
irregularities and human rights violations in the recording of the statement.   In reference 
to irregularities, it was contended that the appellant was not informed of the charges 
against him before the Magistrate, that the statement was not recorded in a language that the 
appellant spoke, and that the holding that the confession of the appellant was obtained 
voluntarily was not supported by evidence.84 The recording of the confession was done by 
the Magistrate’s clerk, and it was not recorded in the language the appellant spoke.85 
 
The Court showed a willingness to admit a statement, if the impropriety was not a material 
departure from the rules for recording a statement.   In Nashaba,  the confession involved 
various improprieties. First, the appellant was not informed of the charge against him.  
Secondly, the confession was recorded in a language he did not understand.  Thirdly, the 
statement purportedly recorded by the Magistrate was in fact recorded  by his clerk.86 The 
Court held  that the irregularities  committed  by the Magistrate were not prohibited by the 
law, and that the procedure adopted was not a material departure from the Guidelines for 
Recording Confessions.87 The Court stated further that although the only omission was that 
of the Magistrate in not certifying the charge and caution statement, it was cured by the 
confirmation by the appellant that the recording was accurate.88 
 
The Court further held that the Chief Justice’ Rules on Recording Confessions were rules of 
practice and not law, and as such a contravention thereof would not render the recording to be 
bad if the confession was found to be voluntary.89 The rationale for the holding was the 
presence of voluntariness.  If the Court could establish that the irregular recording of the 
confession was done voluntarily, it would admit it.90 
 
This case reiterates the position adopted in Namulobi, that the Court was inclined to 
admit an improperly obtained statement if the irregularity was shrouded in a cloak of 
																																								 																				
80 Id., at 27. 
81 Nashaba v. Uganda, supra note 4. 
82 Id., at 2. 
83 Id., at 3. 
84 Id., at 4. 
85 Id., at 6. The dialect the appellant understood was Runyakitara, which was not used in the recording of the confession. 
86 Id., at 4-5. 
87 Id., at 6. 
88 Id., at 7. 
89 Id.. 
90 Id., at 8. 
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voluntariness.  The Court used substantive justice to maintain the admission of a confession 
despite the procedural irregularities in recording it.  The Court used a subjective test of 
whether the accused was made to sign the confession involuntarily, and it was  established 
that he signed it voluntarily.   In addition, the extent of the Magistrates’ non-adherence to 
the Rules of practice was not great enough to oust the voluntariness in the making of the 
confession.  The Court gave the procedural rules a low grading because they were rules of 
practice and not rules of law.  The admission of the confession was based on its subjective 
content with regard to the commission of the crime, and not on the procedural objective of 
following the rules.  Despite the fact that the appellant sought to have the appeal allowed on 
the basis of the failure to follow the correct rules regarding the recording of confessions, 
unlike in Namulobi, the Court watered down the rules to mere rules of practice and not 
rules of law.  This was an indication that substantive justice was more important that 
procedural justice. 
 
While substantive justice was upheld as long as it did not occasion injustice to the appellant, 
the yardstick for measuring the injustice was the ability to regard the demands of 
substantive justice as being greater than those of  procedural justice.  Just as in Namulobi, 
Nashaba develops the principle that improperly obtained evidence may be admitted if it does 
not cause injustice to the accused. The question of injustice is for the  courts to decide 
according to the circumstances of each case.   In addition, the Supreme  Court seemed to 
concretise its stance of being objective in following the subjective  content  of  the  
confession  instead  of  being  objective  in  following  the objective rules of recording 
confessions. 
 
In Ssewankambo Francis, Kiwanuka Paul, Mutaya Muzairu v. Uganda,91 the appellants 
appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the Court of Appeal erred in law when it 
admitted their retracted confessions.92 The first and second appellants contended that their 
confessions were recorded by the same investigating officer, which was an irregularity.93 In 
addition, in the course of admitting the confession, the trial judge did not inquire from 
the defence as to whether it had any objection to the admission of the confessions, and 
his failure to do so was a failure of justice.94 
 
The Court agreed with the appellants and held that it was improper to admit the confessions, 
because the trial judge did not give the defence an opportunity to say anything about the 
nature of the confessions before they were admitted.95 The High Court did not subject the 
admissibility of the confession  to  a  trial  within  a  trial,  to  test  the voluntariness of the 
recording of the confessions.96 
 
With respect to the confessions, they were not admitted in evidence because of the procedural 
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92 Id., at 4. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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improprieties that surrounded their making.  It was a rule that had to be upheld by each 
judicial officer that all confessions had to be subjected to a trial within a trial.97 The decision 
in Ssewankambo indicated a shift by the Court regarding the admission of improperly 
obtained confessions.  It indicated that the Court would not admit evidence of confessions 
where the procedural rules were not followed. This case affected the consistency that the 
Court had created in its earlier decisions in Namulobi and Nashaba.  The jurisprudence that 
had been created was put on a halt. 
 
With regard to how the Court dealt with the principles of substantive justice vis-a-vis the 
principles of procedural justice or the balancing of the two principles, the Court used the 
procedural rules that govern the recording of confessions to arrive at substantive  justice. 
The Court used a two-step approach by employing a fusion of procedural justice and 
substantive justice. 
 
First, in the employment of procedural justice, the Court adopted a subjective stance by 
following the procedural rules relating to the letter, and that failure to do so would lead to 
the non-admission of the evidence.  Secondly, the Court then used the procedural law 
findings to arrive at a value judgment based on the proportionality and objectivity of legal 
principles. 
 
The Court, therefore, adopted a fusion of both procedural and substantive justice before it 
arrived at its decision. In addition, the Court also upheld the notion that it will not sustain an 
illegality once it is brought to its attention.98 The Court deviated from the condonation theory 
applied in Namulobi and Nashaba to the deterrence theory in deciding whether to admit the 
confession. This forward-looking theory of deterrence was aimed at ensuring that the 
persons who engage in obtaining evidence improperly are discouraged from doing so.99 
 
It must be noted that in this case, apart from the procedural irregularities, the Court also 
looked at other factors, such as human rights violations in the course of obtaining the 
evidence.  It may, therefore, be said that the existence of factors other than the improprieties 
in the recording of the evidence played a role in the decision of the Court. 
 
In Mweru Ali, Abas Kalema, Sulaiman Senkumbi v. Uganda,100  the appellants were charged 
with robbery and were convicted on the basis of confessions made by the first and second 
appellants.101 They appealed on the grounds that the confessions had been repudiated, and 
that it was wrong for the trial court judge to rely on confessions that had been irregularly 
obtained.102 
 
																																								 																				
97 Id. 
98 Makula International v. Emmanuel Nsubuga [1982] HCB 11. See also, Francis Mpamizo v. Uganda Kabale High Court Criminal 
Revision Case [2011] UGHC 30 3 4. 
99 Madden, supra note 19, at 448. 
100 Mweru Ali, Abas Kalema, Sulaiman Senkumbi v. Uganda Unreported Supreme Court case 33 of 2002 21 August 2003. 
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102 Id., at 2. 
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According to the first appellant, his confession was irregularly obtained in so far as it was 
not recorded voluntarily.103 The Supreme Court rejected this ground of appeal and held that 
the confession was properly admitted.  The rationale was that the first appellant willingly 
signed the charge and caution statement and that after recording the statement, it was read 
back to him before he countersigned it.104 It was established further that the appellant 
offered a detailed explanation of his role in the commission of the robbery: his attendance at 
preparatory meetings, taking part in the robbery, and getting a share of the proceeds.105 
The retracted confession was corroborated by evidence of the discovery of the gun alluded 
to by the first appellant in the confession, the  conduct of the appellant which led to the 
arrest of the other suspects, and the confession of the second appellant.106 In addition, 
the first appellant was a former police officer, who ought to have insisted that the 
statement be subjected to a trial within a trial but decided not to do so; and his choices 
could not be used as reasons not to admit the confession.107 
 
In  relation  to  the  confession  of  the  second  appellant,  he  stated  that  his confession  was 
not recorded  in  a language that he  understood.108 While the Court emphasised the need to 
record statements in accordance with the procedure set out by the  Chief Justice’s 
instructions dated 3 February 1973, it was persuaded that the recording  of the 
confession in English did not occasion an injustice to the second appellant.109 It was 
established that the officer who recorded the statement followed the correct procedure before 
and after recording the confession.110 It was established that the appellant actually feigned 
illiteracy so as to attempt to ensure that the confession was not admitted.111 The appeals 
were therefore dismissed. 
 
With regard  to  balancing  substantive  and  procedural  justice,  the  Court downplayed the 
failure to follow the rules of recording confessions since it found that the failure to test the 
one confession in a trial within a trial, or to record the other confession in a language the 
appellant understood, were not fatal to the appellants.  In this case, the appellants were 
trying to benefit from the improprieties in recording the confessions that they had made 
voluntarily. 
 
The Court adopted an approach that made any development in the jurisprudence inconsistent.  
While in the earlier case of Ssewankambo the Court decried the need to follow the procedure 
for recording confessions, it drifted back to the earlier principles in Namulobi and Nashaba.  
In a bid to prevent the appellants from benefitting from an illegality, the Court used the 
existence of other evidence, such as evidence of the recovery of a gun and the appellant’s 
co-operation with the police, to arrive at a value judgment.  The Court sacrificed procedural 
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rules to arrive at substantive justice.  This is an indication that procedural justice need not 
be attained before substantive justice is achieved. 
 
The author differs from the view of the Court in this case and is of the view that the Court 
should have remained consistent in following the procedural aspects, and should have 
disregarded the confessions since they were not subjected to a trial within a trial or were not 
recorded in a language that an appellant understood.   There was evidence that could be 
used to sustain the convictions.  The identification of the first and second  appellants in 
broad daylight at the scene of the crime by prosecution witnesses,112 the recovery of the 
gun,113  and the evidence of the first appellant about his role in the robbery. 
 
The Court could have followed the procedure to disregard the evidence of the confessions 
and still maintained the convictions of the accused persons.  These pieces of  evidence  point  
to  a  subjective  notion  of  justice  which,  if  applied  using  the proportionality test, would 
still ensure that substantive justice was achieved.   With regard to the theoretical 
considerations relating to the admission of evidence, the Court admitted the evidence on the 
basis of its reliability, despite the fact that it at the same time condoned the excesses of the 
police in recording the confessions. While the Court struck a balance between adducing 
reliable evidence at the cost of condoning improper police conduct,114 it created inconsistency 
in its jurisprudence dealing with evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
 
In Walugembe Henry, Ssali Paul Sande and Kamanzi Joseph v. Uganda (Walugembe),115   
the appellants sought to have their confessions struck off the record because of the  
irregularities  in  their  recording.  The first  and  second  appellants informed the Court that 
their confessions were recorded in English rather than in the language that they 
understood.116 
 
In addition, the confessions were recorded by the same police officer117 and the confession 
of the second appellant was recorded in the presence of the officer in charge of the police 
station.  Other facts that were vital to the Court in making its decision were that the third 
appellant cooperated with the police in recovering the stolen items from a certain swamp,118 
and that the first and second appellants stated that their confessions were obtained 
through torture.119 
 
The Court in allowing the appeal stated that it was a misdirection to admit confessions 
with these irregularities,  and without  testing the voluntariness  of the confessions.120 The 
rationale for this holding was that where a police officer recorded a statement from an 
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accused person and went on to record another  from a second accused, he would be 
tempted to use the information from the confession of the first accused in the confession of 
the second confession.121 
 
Just like in Ssewankambo, the Court made use of procedural rules to arrive at substantive 
justice.  Secondly, the Court leaned to the deterrence theory in deciding whether to admit 
the confession in order to ensure that persons who engage in obtaining evidence improperly 
are discouraged from doing so.122 This case also involved human rights violations in the 
course of obtaining the confessions. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
At the outset, it should be noted that the cases of Namulobi, Nashaba, Ssewankambo, 
Mweru  and  Walugembe  involved  irregularities  in  recording  confessions.    With 
particular regard to the recording of confessions in a language that the accused could not  
understand,   the  Court  dealt  with  this  question  in  the  cases  of  Nashaba, 
Ssewankambo,  Mweru,  and  Walugembe.    It  attached  little  significance  on  this It  
attached  little  significance  on  this procedural issue in Nashaba and Mweru and upheld the 
admission of the confessions. 
Conversely,  it  placed  emphasis  on  the  need  to  follow  this  rule  of  practice  in 
Ssewankambo and Walugembe and this emphasis led to the non-admission of the 
confessions.  In Ssewankambo and Mweru, the Court had evidence that, in addition to the 
improperly obtained evidence, there were violations of human rights in the process of 
obtaining the confessions. 
 
This  analysis  identifies  three  points.    First,  that  there  is  an  inconsistent jurisprudence 
in dealing with evidence obtained through improper means. Secondly, the Court has not been 
consistent in following the procedural rules governing the recording of confessions and 
thereby has created the inconsistency. Thirdly, where the Court has insisted  that  procedural  
rules  are  followed  in  the  recording  of  confessions,  the confessions  have  not been 
admitted.    Fourthly,  where the Court has disregarded procedural  rules,  it  has used  
substantive  justice  as a tool of proportionality  and subjectivity in admitting the 
confessions. 
 
Where failure to follow the procedural rules would not change the outcome of the process of 
recording the confessions, the Court disregarded the procedure and maintained that the 
confessions were properly admitted.  This was dependent on the presence  of  other  
evidence  that  corroborated  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  such  as: cooperation with the 
police in the investigations; reading of the confession to the accused before he signed it; 
the decision not to contest the admission of the confession in the court of the first instance; 
and the existence of deceit and a desire to abuse the process relating the recording of 
confessions.123 
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Conversely, where the failure to follow the procedural rules would greatly change the 
outcome of the process and the subsequent judgment, the Court would not allow the 
admission of the confession.  In addition, the Court would not maintain the admission of the 
confession if the irregularities were marred by human rights violations. In all the 
circumstances stated above, the Court would then make a value judgment based on its 
decision on the confession and other relevant evidence.  Thus, while the admission of the 
confessions was seen as a condonation of the excesses of the police, it was also taken to be a 
mode of ensuring that confessions with a high probative value are admitted, to enable the 
Court to arrive at a value judgment.  The Courts seem to admit improperly obtained 
confessions if the probative value of the evidence is not impaired by the unlawful method 
used in acquiring such evidence, and if the relevance of such evidence cannot be affected by 
the mere fact that it was unlawfully procured.124 
 
In the cases discussed involving impropriety in obtaining confessions, the Court states that it 
admits confessions if they do not occasion an injustice to the accused.  A question  arises 
whether  it is substantive injustice or procedural injustice.   While substantive justice may 
mean an accused person suffering the consequences of his actions, procedural justice may 
mean that the outcome of the process would not change, even where a few rules were not 
followed.   The injustice referred to seems to be a procedural injustice,  for  instance, where 
the accused is read  the contents of the confession before he or she signs it, does not 
complain about it to the court, and later seeks to manipulate a rule that was not followed 
because the evidence may be used to incriminate him. 
 
While the Court is trying to arrive at substantive justice, the law enforcement agencies ought 
to take responsibility to ensure that they follow the procedures to the letter so as to avoid 
placing the courts in an awkward position.  In addition, the courts should be seen to be 
administering justice in a manner that is fair and consistent.  The discretion should be 
exercised in a way that does not lead to an unfair trial or place the administration of justice 
into disrepute. It is for this reason that consistency is required to enable parties to have a fair 
idea of what the outcome of a case may be. 
 
In the author’s view, the varying reasons only buttress the effect of using discretion on a 
case-by-case basis to ensure justice.  While discretion is paramount in ensuring  that  
evidence  admitted  does  not  operate  unfairly  against  the  accused, consistency is also 
needed in the development of jurisprudence if procedural laws are to be used as 
handmaidens of justice.  It follows, therefore, that a framework needs to be put in place to 
cater for evidence obtained through improper means to ensure that the accused is protected in 
deserving cases, and that a court is not seen to be condoning the excesses of the police.  The 
courts should insist that the rules of practice for recording confessions are followed to the 
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letter, such that consistency is developed. 
 
The author proposes a framework which requires the courts to embrace the use of both 
procedural and substantive rules to arrive at substantive justice.  While this is a  diversion  
from  Namulobi,  Nashaba,  and  Mweru,  where  the  Court  disregarded procedural aspects  
in favour of substantive justice, it still leads one to the desired judgment.  The substantive 
approach requires that a confession is corroborated before it is admitted.  Since the evidence 
that corroborates a confession may be conclusive to sustain a conviction,  the perception  
that  procedural rules will lead to substantive injustice is of no consequence. 
 
A dual approach should be used.  First, where procedural rules with regard to the recording 
of a confession are not followed, it should not be admitted. Secondly, the evidence which 
would have been used to corroborate the confession is used to ensure a  conviction.   This 
approach enhances fairness at the trial, and the repute of the judiciary in the 
administration of justice. 
 
 
